The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations
Richard A. Posnert
In a recent article in the Review, Jonathan Landers attempts
an ambitious rethinking of legal policy toward the creditors of affiliated corporations.' He organizes his discussion around three specific
questions:
(1) The parent company has advanced funds to its subsidiary in the form of a loan; if the subsidiary does not have
enough assets to satisfy all of its creditors, should the parent
be treated differently from other creditors?
(2) If a subsidiary is unable to satisfy a creditor's claim
out of its own assets, should the creditor be entitled to satisfy
his claim out of the assets of the corporate parent (i.e., to
"pierce the corporate veil")?
(3) If two affiliated corporations become bankrupt,
should the assets of, and the claims against, the two corporations be pooled?
Landers believes that a group of affiliated corporations is a single
economic enterprise in reality and should be treated as such by the
law. This belief leads him to answer all of the above questions affirmatively, with two major qualifications.
First, Landers does not think that existing law-reflecting as it
does a settled if perhaps questionable legislative policy in favor of
limited shareholder liability-is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a general rule of piercing the corporate veil. The furthest that
judicial reform can go in this area, in his opinion, is to allow the veil
to be pierced whenever the parent of the bankrupt corporation has
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failed either (1) to endow the subsidiary with sufficient resources to
make it economically viable or (2) to observe the formalities prescribed by state law for creating a separate corporation. 2 Second,
Landers recognizes that consolidation of bankrupt affiliates may be
unfair to a creditor who has relied on the separate character of the
affiliate to which he extended credit; forcing him to compete with
the creditors of another corporation for access to the debtor's assets
would undermine his reliance. Landers therefore proposes to protect
a creditor's specific reliance where proved.3 Subject to these qualifications, Landers would greatly reduce the respect accorded corporate forms when they are invoked by a corporation to defeat the
claims of creditors of an affiliate.
Landers's analysis appears to be shaped by a conception of the
credit process as one in which scheming entrepreneurs manipulate
hapless creditors. The entrepreneur creates multiple corporations in
order to avoid the legitimate claims of creditors and others, such as
the Internal Revenue Service; he juggles the assets of the enterprise
among the corporations to thwart these claimants; and all this occurs against the background of a law of corporations that, in Landers's view, fails to accord adequate protection to creditors even
when they are dealing with a nonaffiliated corporation. "Through
low capitalization requirements and the uncertain prospect of veil
piercing, the law has, to a large extent, placed the cost of promoting
new businesses on the creditors of the corporation and, through
them, on the public as a whole." 4 Corporation law, Landers believes,
has externalized the risks of business failure from the shareholders
to the creditors; his proposed reforms would shift some of these risks
back to the shareholders, where they belong.
Landers writes persuasively and his legal scholarship is meticulous. But his neglect of economic principles vital to an understanding of credit transactions, limited liability, and corporate affiliation
undermines both his general approach and his specific conclusions.
I shall attempt to elucidate these economic principles in the first
part of the paper and apply them to the three specific questions
examined in Landers's article in the second. Part I is also designed
to stand by itself as a general introduction to the economic analysis
of problems in corporation law and related fields.
2 Id. at 621.
3 Id. at 632.
1 Id. at 593.
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I.
A.

THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE FINANCE

Credit Transactions and Limited Liability

Mr. A. Smith wants to borrow $1 million to invest in a mining
venture together with $2 million of his own money. He wants the
loan for only a year since by the end of the year it will be apparent

whether the venture has succeeded; if it has, he would then want
to obtain longer-term financing. Since Smith is a man of means, if
he gives his personal note to the lender the latter would regard a
one-year loan of $1 million as riskless and would offer Smith the
riskless short-term interest rate, say six percent. But Smith is reluctant to stake more than $2 million on the outcome of the mining
venture. He proposes to the lender a different arrangement, whereby
the lender will agree to look for repayment of the loan exclusively
to the assets of the mining venture, if any exist, a year hence. Under
this arrangement, Smith will be able to limit his liability to his
investment in the venture.
The lender estimates that there is an 80 percent probability
that the venture will be sufficiently successful to enable repayment
of the loan and interest on the due date, and a 20 percent probability
that the venture will fail so badly that there will be insufficient
assets to repay even a part of the loan. On these assumptions' the
solution to the lender's problem is purely mechanical; he must calculate the amount, payable at the end of a year, that when mnltiplied by 80 percent (the probability that payment will in fact be
made) will equal $1,060,000, the repayment he would have received
at the end of the year had he made the riskless loan. That amount
is $1,325,000. 7 Accordingly, the lender will charge Smith 32.5 per-

cent interest for the loan if Smith's obligation to repay is limited to
the assets of the venture. At this rate of interest the lender is indifferent as between the riskless and the risky loan.
This example illustrates the fundamental point that the interest rate on a loan is payment not only for renting capital but also
for the risk that the borrower will fail to return it. It may be wondered why the borrower might want to shift a part of the risk of
business failure to the lender, given that he must compensate him
for bearing added risk. There are two reasons why the lender might
be the superior risk bearer. First, the lender may be in a better
5 To simplify exposition, I ignore the intermediate possibilities.
I Plus the additional assumption that the lender is "risk neutral." This term is explained

in note 8 infra.
7 Calculated by solving .8x = $106 for x.
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position than the borrower to appraise the risk. Compare the positions of the individual shareholder in a publicly held corporation
and the banks that lend the corporation its working capital. It may
be easier and hence cheaper for the bank to appraise the risk of a
default and the resulting liability than it would be for the shareholder, who may know little or nothing about the business in which
he has invested. Second, the borrower may be risk averse and the
lender less so (or risk neutral, or even risk preferring).8 Thus, unlimited liability would discourage investment in business ventures by
individuals who wanted to make small, passive investments in such
ventures. It would also discourage even substantial entrepreneurial
investments by risk-averse individuals-and most individuals are
risk averse.'
A borrower could in principle negotiate with the lender for an
express limited-liability provision. The more usual course, however,
is to incorporate and have the corporation borrow the money. The
basic principle of corporation law is that the shareholders of a corporation are not personally liable for the corporation's debts unless
they agree to assume such liability. Corporate borrowing therefore
automatically limits the borrower's liability to his investment in the
corporation. The fact that the law permits Smith to limit his liabilI An.individual is risk averse if he prefers the certain equivalent of an expected value to
the expectation-the certainty of receiving $1 to a 10 percent chance of receiving $10. A risk
preferrer would have the opposite preference, and a risk-neutral individual would be indifferent. A corporation is less likely to be risk averse than an individual because the shareholders
of the corporation can offset any risks incurred by that corporation by holding a diversified
portfolio of securities. Moreover, a large lender can eliminate or greatly reduce the risk of loss
on a particular loan by holding a diversified portfolio of loans. On both counts it seems likely
that individual investors would often be more averse to bearing unlimited personal liability
for the failure of an enterprise in which they had invested than lenders would be to bearing
the risk of that failure to the extent of their loan to the enterprise.
Risk aversion is implied by the principle of the diminishing marginal utility of (money)
income. The principle of diminishing marginal utility is easiest to grasp in the case of a
tangible commodity like hats: the more hats one has, the less each additional hat contributes
to one's utility. Although money is a much more versatile good than hats, the principle of
diminishing marginal utility should hold: as people obtain more dollars, the increment to
their utility contributed by each additional dollar should become progressively smaller. Suppose that an individual derives 50 utiles (an arbitrary nonmonetary measure of welfare) from
the last dollar that he possesses, but would derive only 40 utiles from having another dollar.
Then he would not pay a dollar for a 50 percent chance of obtaining two dollars (even though
the dollar cost and expected dollar gain of the wager are the same-$1), for the disutility to
him of the transaction-50 utiles-would exceed the expected utility-45 utiles (50 percent
of 90 utiles, the payoff if the wager is successful). Since some people do gamble, it is plain
that not all people are consistently risk averse. But there is considerable empirical evidence
that most investors, at least, are risk averse, as the theory of diminishing marginal utility
would imply. The evidence is summarized in J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 198-227 (1973).
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ity by conducting his mining venture in the corporate form does not
imply, however, that the law is somehow tilted against creditors or
enables venturers to externalize the risks of business failure, as Landers argues.10 Although incorporation permits Smith to shift a part
of the risk of failure to the lender, there is no externality; the lender
is fully compensated by the higher interest rate that the corporation
must pay by virtue of enjoying limited liability. Moreover, the
lender is free to insist as a condition of making the loan that Smith
guarantee the debts of the corporation personally or that he consent
to including in the loan agreement other provisions that will limit
the lender's risk-though any reduction in the risk will reduce the
interest rate the lender can charge since a portion of that rate is, as
we have seen, compensation to the lender for agreeing to bear a part
of the risk of the venture.
There is an instructive parallel here to a fundamental principle
of bankruptcy law: the discharge of the bankrupt from his debts.
This principle, which was originally developed for the protection of
business rather than individual bankrupts,"I enables the venturer to
limit his risk of loss to his current assets; he is not forced to hazard
his entire earning capacity on the venture. Incorporation performs
the same function of encouraging investment by enabling the risk
averse to limit their risk of loss to their investment.
Far from externalizing the risks of business ventures, the principle of limited liability in corporation law facilitates a form of transaction advantageous to both investors and creditors; in its absence
the supply of investment and the demand for credit might be much
smaller than they are. Landers overlooks this essential point be12
cause he is unsure of the basis for limited liability.
In discussing the reciprocal relationship of risk and interest
rates, I have concentrated on the risk of default that is anticipated
when the loan is first made. During the period that the loan is
outstanding, however, the risk of default may change. To the extent
that the change can be foreseen, it will be reflected in the interest
rate negotiated at the outset. To the extent that it cannot be foreseen, the lender may seek to protect himself by offering an amortized loan (which is repaid continuously rather than in a single
payment at the end of the term), even if the assets available to repay
the loan are not expected to depreciate physically. Since the balance
outstanding on the loan declines as a function of time and hence of
,OLanders, supra note 1, at 619-20.
"

See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *473-74.

12

See Landers, supra note 1, at 617-19.
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the probability of unforeseen changes in the risk of default, the
lender is protected in part against those changes. Nor is the borrower prejudiced. Should no unforeseen increases in risk materialize, the borrower will be able to negotiate a reduction in the interest
rate as the outstanding balance of the loan declines.' 3 If the lender
refuses to renegotiate the interest rate, the borrower can replace the
loan at a lower rate from another lender; if there is a penalty in the
loan agreement for prepayment, the borrower was presumably compensated for agreeing to it and cannot complain.
The parties will find it difficult, however, to adjust the interest
.rate or other terms of the loan to reflect the possibility of the borrower's deliberately increasing the lender's risk. After the interest
rate has been agreed upon and the loan agreement signed, the borrower may increase the risk of defaulting on the loan by, for example, obtaining additional loans not subordinated to the first or transferring assets to its shareholders or others without adequate consideration. 11In effect the borrower has unilaterally reduced the interest
rate he is paying for the loan. That rate was negotiated with reference to a lower anticipated level of risk than has come to pass. Given
the actual level of risk, the borrower is being allowed to borrow
money at less than its true cost.
To protect himself against such dangers the lender may insist
that the borrower agree to limit his total indebtedness or the
amount of dividends payable during the term of the loan, where
"dividend" is broadly defined to include any disposition of corporate assets for less than full market value. Or the lender may insist
on some minimum capitalization, impose other restrictions, or require collateral. Alternatively he may decide to forgo protection and
demand a higher interest rate. It may be difficult, however, to quan"1 This will be true unless he has in the meantime assumed other liabilities as a result
of which the risk of defaulting on the loan may be unchanged or even increased. See text and
note at note 14 infra.
11Anything that increases the borrower's debt-equity ratio will increase the likelihood
of default, because debt charges are fixed costs to the firm and cannot be reduced if there
are adverse business developments, such as a decline in demand for the firm's product, that
lead to a reduction in its earnings.
It might be asked why a firm would deliberately increase the risk of its defaulting on the
loan, since any short-rn gains will usually be outweighed by the long-run loss of creditor
confidence, resulting in much higher interest rates when the firm next wants to borrow. This
is true for the firm that expects to remain in business for the indefinite future. But the firm
that expects to be bankrupt and is trying to minimize the impact of bankruptcy on its
shareholders will discount, perhaps to zero, the loss of creditor confidence, and firms of this
sort presumably account for a substantial fraction of the actual defaults. The danger that a
firm which has in fact defaulted will, prior to default, have taken various measures that
increased the risk of default to some of its creditors is thus a substantial one.
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tify the probability that the borrower will deliberately attempt to
increase the riskiness of the loan.
Although the analysis to this point has focused on the explicit
loan, it also applies to extensions of credit in other forms. For example, the merchant who does not insist on payment in cash and the
employee who is not paid until the end of the week are creditors,
and their estimation of the risk of default will determine the amount
of credit extended, the length of time for which it is extended, and
the interest rate (which, of course, need not be stated separately
from the sale price or wage rate). The major difference between the
trade creditor and the financial creditor is that the latter, because
he is a specialist in credit and because the amount of credit that he
extends to each creditor is apt to be larger, is much more likely to
negotiate the terms of credit explicitly. This means, as we are about
to see, that the provisions of corporation law will have a greater
impact on credit transactions with trade creditors than on those
with financial creditors.
B.

The Economic Effects of Corporation Law

An important implication of the foregoing analysis is that the
specific doctrines of corporation law should not be expected, in general, to have a profound impact on the credit system or to alter the
balance of advantage between debtor and creditor. 15 If corporation
law did not provide for limited shareholder liability, then in situations where the parties desired to limit that liability in exchange for
a higher interest rate the loan agreement would contain an express
provision limiting liability. Conversely, under existing law a firm
asked to lend money to a corporation in which it lacks confidence
can insist as a condition of making the loan that the shareholders
agree to guarantee repayment personally; of course, the interest rate
will be lower than it would have been without such a guarantee.
Similarly, if the rules of corporation law limiting the payment
of dividends to the amount of "earned surplus" shown on the corporation's books effectively protect creditors against attempts by firms
to increase the risk of default after the loan has been made, well and
good. But if corporation laws were amended to drop all limitations
on the payment of dividends, the major consequence would be that
those creditors who wanted dividend limitations would have to ask
that they be written into the loan agreement.
,5 Cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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There are, however, exceptions to the proposition that corporation law does not affect the allocation of resources. One is the involuntary extension of credit. A pedestrian is struck by a moving van
in circumstances making the moving company liable to him for a
tort. Pre-existing negotiations, explicit or implicit, between the parties with respect to the moving company's ability to make good on
the pedestrian's claim are simply not feasible. Since the parties
have no opportunity to transact around the provisions of corporation
law, the provisions governing limited liability may alter the relative
position of debtor and creditor.
A more common exception occurs where, although the context
is one of voluntary transacting, the costs of explicitly negotiating the
question of extent of liability are high in relation to the stakes involved. The slight probability that an employee will be seriously
injured on the job, when multiplied by the probability that the
employer will have insufficient assets to satisfy his claim for workmen's compensation, may be too small to warrant inclusion of an
express term in the employment contract to cover that contingency.
In this case, too, whatever term is implied as a matter of corporate
or bankruptcy law will control the parties' relations even if it is
contrary to what the parties would have negotiated in a world of zero
transaction costs. But there is an important difference: the wage
rate can adjust to compensate the worker for the risk of nonpayment
of any *compensation claim that he may some day have against his
employer. Such compensation for bearing an added risk of nonpayment is precluded in the case where the parties have no contractual
or potentially contractual relationship at all-the usual situation in
an accident between strangers.
These exceptions to one side, the primary utility of corporation
law lies in providing a set of standard, implied contract terms, for
example, governing credit, so that business firms do not have to
stipulate these terms anew every time they transact, although they
could do so if necessary. To the extent that the terms implied by
corporation law accurately reflect the normal desires of transacting
parties, they reduce the cost of transactions. The criterion of an
efficient corporation law is therefore whether the terms do in fact
reflect commercial realities, so that transacting parties are generally
content with them. A corporation law that is out of step with those
realities, and so induces contracting parties to draft waivers of the
contract terms supplied by the law, is inefficient because it imposes
unnecessary transaction costs.
Thus a corporation law is inefficient if it fails to provide standard implied contract terms that afford creditors the sorts of protec-
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tions against default that they would normally insist upon in an
express negotiation. Such a law can be criticized for creating avoidable costs of explicit negotiation. In some cases it can also be criticized for leading creditors to forgo desired protective provisions and
to settle instead for a higher interest rate as a second-best alternative to the desired protection.
Landers's criticisms, however, are of an entirely different nature. His complaint against a corporation or bankruptcy law that
fails to give creditors adequate protection against default is that it
shifts the costs of entrepreneurship from shareholders to creditors.
Except in the special case of the tort creditor, 6 this is a serious
overstatement. At the worst, such a law may lead to somewhat
higher interest rates as compensation for the absence of protective
provisions that would reduce the risk of default; more probably it
will lead simply to lengthier credit agreements. Transacting parties
will negotiate explicitly the inclusion of protective provisions that
a proper corporation law would read automatically into the credit
transaction. The additional transaction costs, to the extent that
they are borne in the first instance by the lender, will be passed on
in whole or part to the borrower in the form of a (slightly) higher
interest rate," thereby reducing the amount of credit extended, presumably also slightly. But this will be the only allocative effect of a
corporation law that fails to give the creditors the protections they
would normally demand. And observe that such a law hurts borrowers as well as lenders, by raising interest rates."
C.

Creditor Protection: The Problems of Information and
Supervision

Let us take a closer look at the types of protection that creditors
would normally insist upon and that would therefore be found in an
efficient corporation or bankruptcy statute. It is convenient to divide the sources of risk faced by the creditor into two types along the
lines of the earlier analysis. The first is the risk of default based on
circumstances known or anticipated when the loan is made. The
" And even this case must be qualified. Where the tort occurs between the parties to a
pre-existing contractual relationship (e.g., a bus passenger injured by the bus driver's negligence), the costs of the accident are not externalized.
" Thus the interest rate may be viewed as having three components: the cost of riskless
capital (which includes any anticipated inflation), the cost of the risk assumed by the lender,
and the administrative costs of the credit transaction incurred by the lender.
18The analysis of the economic effects of corporation law is, of course, merely a special
case of the economic analysis of contract law, i.e., the law governing voluntary transactions.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-65 (1973).
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creditor's interest is not necessarily in minimizing this risk; since it
is compensated risk any measures taken to reduce it will also reduce
the interest rate. The creditor's interest lies rather in forming an
accurate idea of the risk, for otherwise he cannot determine what
interest rate to charge. Assessment of the risk of default requires
accurate information about the existing and expected assets and
liabilities of the borrowing corporation and of anyone else who may
be liable for the corporation's debts, insofar as those assets and
liabilities effect the creditor's ability to obtain repayment. Coping
with this risk presents the problem of information. Measures that
increase the creditor's costs of information are prima facie undesirable. A good example of such a measure would be misrepresentation
by the borrower of his solvency.
The second source of risk to the creditor is the possibility that
the corporation will take steps to increase the riskiness of the loan
after the terms have been set. The problem of coping with this risk
is the problem of supervision; the creditor must supervise or regulate the corporation's disposition of its assets to the extent necessary
to prevent any deliberate attempts to reduce the assets available to
repay the loan. Dividend limitations are an illustration of the supervision type of credit term.
Obtaining information and supervising a corporation's internal
affairs are costly undertakings. Economizing on these costs is one
objective, social as well as private, of the provisions in a credit
instrument. The first question to ask about any existing or proposed
creditor's right under corporation or other laws is whether it actually
reduces the creditor's information or supervision costs. It is often a
difficult question to answer, because of differences in the costs of
information and supervision to financial, trade, and nonbusiness 9
creditors, because of the debtor's ability to increase those costs by
various acts and omissions, and because of differences in the nature
of the collateral put up by different debtors (e.g., land versus inventory).
The analysis, moreover, cannot stop with a consideration of the
creditor's costs. The goal is to minimize not just the administrative
costs of the credit transaction but its total social costs. Even if a rule
abrogating the limited liability of corporate shareholders would
lower the costs of credit administration by reducing the risk of defaulting on a loan and thereby decreasing the optimal level of expenditures on supervision and information,2 it would probably be
See pp. 522-23 infra.
20 It is not certain that it would reduce those costs overall, however, since creditors of
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an uneconomical rule because it would prevent a type of risk shifting (from shareholders to creditors) that is apparently highly efficient, judging by its prevalence. To the extent that-paradoxical as
it may seem-risk can often be borne more cheaply by creditors
than by shareholders, a rule that prevented the shifting of risk from
the latter to the former would impose costs in undesired risk that
might be much greater than the savings in reduced costs of credit
administration. Similarly, a rule that forbade any payment of dividends to corporate shareholders would reduce supervision costs by
increasing the assets available for the payment of creditors' claims,
but it would also reduce the attractiveness of owning stock to those
investors who do not consider appreciation a perfect substitute for
periodic income. 2' It would probably not be an optimal rule considering all the relevant costs and benefits of corporate activity.
The ultimate objective of the credit process is to minimize the
overall social costs of capital through a complex allocation of costs,
including the disutility of risk, between borrower and lender. Measures that minimize the risk borne by the creditor will lower interest
rates both directly and by reducing the creditor's optimum expenditure on obtaining information and supervising the debtor's business.22 But beyond a certain point the cost to the investors of the
added risk they are made to bear may well exceed the reduction in
interest rates. It is of no benefit to a corporation to be able to borrow
at six percent on condition that its shareholders personally guarantee repayment of the loan, if the expected earnings of the corporation are insufficient to compensate the shareholders for giving such
a guarantee. An efficient corporation law is not one that maximizes
creditor protection on the one hand or corporate freedom on the
other, but one that mediates between these goals in a fashion that
minimizes the costs of raising money for investment.
D.

The Reasons for and Consequences of Corporate Affiliation

Landers is interested in the special case of the creditor of a
corporation wholly owned by, or otherwise 100 percent affiliated
individuals exposed to unlimited liability for the debts of corporations in which they had
invested might, in consequence, have to make a more extensive investigation of such individuals' creditworthiness.
21 The transaction costs involved in selling stock in order to convert appreciation into
cash income may make periodic income preferable to appreciation for some investors.
Capital requirements imposed by the lender on the borrower are to be understood in
this light: the more heavily capitalized the borrower is, the less likely he is to dissipate assets
necessary to repay the loan by withdrawing capital from the enterprise in the form of dividends or otherwise.
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with, another corporation. To understand this case it is necessary
to consider how it might come about that one corporation was
owned by or in common with another corporation. Landers's implicit explanation is that an entrepreneur will decide, typically in
order to avoid taxes or limit other liabilities, to divide a unitary
enterprise-a single business in economic terms-into a series of
formally separate but commonly owned and controlled corporations. Under this view of how corporate affiliation arises, the separate corporate status of the different parts of the enterprise is indeed
fictional (whether it is harmful is a separate question). But the view
is seriously incomplete.
To begin with, often a group of affiliated corporations is not a
single enterprise at all. Even before the vogue of the "conglomerate," there were many highly diversified enterprises, comprising a
number of distinct businesses, often separately incorporated and
related only in the integration of a few headquarters functions such
as legal counseling and securities issuance. How might the common
ownership of seemingly unrelated businesses come about? There are
a number of possibilities. First, there may be managerial or financial economies (the businesses aren't really unrelated). Second, the
owners may be trying to reduce risk through diversification. Third,
an enterprise may decide to expand internally (through a separate
corporation) into an unrelated line of business because it perceives
opportunities for greater profits than its shareholders could earn if
the funds employed in entering the new line were instead distributed to the shareholders as dividends. 23 A related point is that a firm
which is not well managed is an attractive target for a takeover bid,
normally by another corporation rather than by an individual or a
group of individuals. The bidder may not be in the same or even in
a related line of business. It may instead be a specialist in identifying undervalued firms. But the takeover bid is only the most dramatic illustration of the operation of the market for corporate assets.
The existence of such a market implies that corporations are frequently in the market for other corporations, sometimes in different
lines of business.
Where a commonly controlled pool of capital is employed in a
number of different lines of business, it is not at all obvious that the
owners of the pool should be treated differently from other venturers. It is especially doubtful in the case of "lateral piercing," which
1 Transaction costs would be lower if the corporation invested directly and there would
also be tax savings to the shareholders.
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Landers appears to regard as indistinguishable in principle from
piercing the subsidiary's corporate veil to reach the parent's assets.24
Suppose that individuals who in the aggregate own 100 percent of
X Corporation's stock create a new corporation, Y, to engage in an
unrelated business. X and Y are affiliates, and Landers I take it
would like the creditors of Y to be able to reach the assets of X. But
why should a group of investors be treated differently by the law just
because they own a corporation engaged in an unrelated business?
And if they should not be treated differently, then why, if X, acting
as an agent of its shareholders, forms Y in order to engage in an
unrelated business, should X's liabilities (and therefore those of its
shareholders) be greater than those borne by other entrants into Ys
market?
Landers's implicit answer is that X may take steps to increase
the risks borne by creditors of Y. X may, for example, cast its equity
investment in Y in the form of a loan, thus reducing the assets
available to satisfy claims of Y's genuine creditors, without disclosure to those creditors. But the same danger is present in the case
of two corporations owned by the same individuals. Indeed, it is
present in the case of an unaffiliated corporation. There is a conflict
of interest between the personal shareholder and the creditor as well
as between the corporate shareholder and the creditor; in both cases
management has an incentive to try to shift uncompensated risk to
the creditor. Is the danger greater when the shareholder is a corporation? Probably it is greatest in the closely held corporation whether
the dominant shareholder is an individual or a corporation. Arguably, therefore, if a shareholder that is a corporation should not be
permitted to hide behind limited liability when the subsidiary corporation is unable to pay a creditor's claims, neither should the
shareholder who is an individual be permitted to invoke limited
liability when the corporation in which he owns stock is unable to
satisfy the corporation's debts. The logic of Landers's arguments
would seem to require the abolition of limited liability across the
board.
To this it may be objected that there is a greater social interest
in according limited liability to personal shareholders than to corporations, in order to make investment in enterprises attractive to
individuals who would be deterred from investing by the prospect
of potentially unlimited personal liability for the debts of the enterprise. A partial answer to this objection is that when a corporation
24

See Landers, supra note 1, at 590, 606, 628.
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undertakes a new venture, it simply cuts short the process by which
corporate assets are first distributed to shareholders in the form of
dividends and then reinvested by those shareholders in a new corporation that undertakes the venture. The corporation's liabilities
should therefore be no greater than those of its shareholders, who
might have made the investment directly (though at a higher cost),
without subjecting their interest in the old corporation to liability
on account of the new corporation's debts. But this argument overlooks a difference between individual and corporate investment. If
a parent corporation is made liable for its subsidiary's debts, the
exposure of the parent's shareholders to liability, although greater
than if the subsidiary enjoyed limited liability, is still limited to
their investment in the parent. Making a parent liable for the subsidiary's debts will not result in unlimited personal liability for the
parent's shareholders, whereas making a personal shareholder liable
for corporate debts would have this effect.
However, the implication of this point-which is that unlimited
corporate-shareholder liability would have a less dampening effect
on individual investment than unlimited personal-shareholder liability-is applicable primarily to the large publicly held corporation, where, as we shall see, the objections to limited liability in the
affiliation context are weak. The investor in the large corporation
is ordinarily in a position to minimize the risk that is transmitted
to him through the ventures undertaken and liabilities incurred by
a corporation in which he owns stock simply by holding a diversified
portfolio of corporate securities. Unlimited corporate-shareholder
liability would threaten such an investor far less than unlimited
personal-shareholder liability. But the investor in a small corporation frequently does not enjoy the same opportunities for diversification. He cannot protect himself against the consequences of unlimited liability of corporate shareholders as effectively as the investor
in the large corporation.
To understand this important point, suppose in our example of
the Smith mining venture that the Smith fortune (other than that
which Mr. Smith plans to commit to the mining venture) is invested
in a radio station owned by a corporation of which Smith is the sole
stockholder. If he forms a new corporation to conduct the mining
venture, and if "lateral piercing" is permitted as Landers would
like, then Smith has hazarded his entire fortune on the outcome of
the mining venture. This may be an unacceptable risk to him. In
this case there is in fact no difference between piercing the corporate
veil to reach the assets of an affiliated corporation and piercing it
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to reach an individual shareholder's assets. The case is extreme, but
approximations to it are not uncommon in the world of small business. This example is to me a decisive objection to a general rule of
piercing the corporate veil to reach the assets of an affiliated corporation. And the case is no different if, instead of Smith's forming a
new corporation to conduct the mining venture, he invests $2 million more in the radio station which then forms a subsidiary to
conduct the venture.
Landers's only reason why the case for limited liability is
weaker for corporate than for personal shareholders is that affiliated
corporations, even if engaged in totally unrelated lines of business,
will be managed differently from independent firms because the
owners will seek to maximize the profits of the enterprise as a whole
rather than the profits of any individual corporation.2 5 This argument is unconvincing. Normally the profits of the group will be
maximized by maximizing the profits of each constituent corporation. Indeed, if the corporations are engaged in truly unrelated lines
of business, the profits of each will be completely independent.
It is true that the common owner can take measures that conceal or distort the relative profitability of his different enterprises,
as by allocating capital among them at arbitrary interest rates. But
it is not true, as Landers implies, that owners invariably or typically
adopt such measures. For one thing, such measures are costly because they reduce the information available to the common owner
about the efficiency with which his various corporations are being
managed. The costs rise rapidly with the size of the overall enterprise. That is why large corporations typically treat their major
divisions and subsidiaries as "profit centers," which are expected to
conduct themselves as if they were independent firms.26 For similar
reasons, divisional managers are compensated on the basis of the
profitability of the subsidiary or division rather than of the enter27
prise as a whole.
Even when the activities of affiliated corporations are closely
related-when they produce substitute or complementary
goods-normally each corporation will be operated as a separate
profit center in order to assure that the profits of the group will be
maximized. It is only in the exceptional case that maximizing the
"

See, e.g., id. at 624-25.

2, In some cases, however, the profit center may not coincide with divisional or corporate

boundary lines.
27 See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 782-83
(D. Conn. 1969); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 109-81 (1970).
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profits of a group of related corporations will involve different behavior from what could be expected of separately owned corporations.18 To be sure, where there are genuine cost savings from common ownership, as in some cases where the affiliated corporations
operate at successive stages in the production of a good, the two
corporations will be managed differently from separately owned corporations in the, same line of business in the sense that their operations will be integrated in a way independent corporations' are not.
But that would not mean that either corporation was, in any sense
relevant to the reasonable expectations of creditors, something other
than a bona fide profit-maximizing firm. Rather, each corporation
would simply be more profitable than its nonintegrated competitors
because its costs were lower. It would be perverse to penalize such
a corporation for its superior efficiency by withdrawing the privilege
of limited liability enjoyed by its nonintegrated competitors. Moreover, in this case as well, the common owner has a strong incentive
to avoid intercorporate transfers that, by distorting the profitability
of each corporation, make it more difficult for the common owner
to evaluate their performance. That is why the price at which one
division of a vertically integrated firm will "sell" its output to another division is normally the market price for the good in question
(less any savings in cost attributable to making an intrafirm transfer
compared to a market transaction), rather than an arbitrary transfer price designed artificially to enhance the profits of one division
at the expense of the other.
The important difference between a group of affiliates engaged
in related businesses and one engaged in a number of unrelated
businesses is not that the conduct of corporations in the first group
will differ from that of nonaffiliated corporations in the same businesses, but that the creditor dealing with a group of affiliates in
related businesses is more likely to be misled into thinking that he
is dealing with a single corporation.29 The mere possibility of deception in some affiliation cases does not in logic justify disregarding
21 For example, if one affiliate had a monopoly of business machines, and the other sold
the punch cards used in the machines, the common owners might decide to lease the machines at cost and charge a high price for each card as a method of price discrimination that
would generate higher profits for the enterprise as a whole than if each corporation maximized
its profits separately. However, as this example suggests, most of the cases in which the
common owners will not seek to maximize the profits of each corporation separately are cases
in which one or more of the corporations has monopoly power; and many such attempts to
exercise monopoly power, as in the "tie-in" example given above, would violate the antitrust
laws. See generally Posner, Exclusionary Practicesand the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CI. L. REv.
506 (1974).
" See text and notes at notes 38-43 infra.
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the corporate form in all such cases. Deception is rather one of the
factors to be considered in applying a rule of creditor protection
properly based on the creditor's information costs. Such a rule will
be described later in this paper.
In sum, Landers's "single enterprise" approach exaggerates the
degree to which we can expect affiliated corporations to be operated
differently from separately owned corporations. A more reasonable
presumption, especially in the case of large publicly owned firms,
is that whether a corporation is owned by individuals or by another
corporation will in general not affect the way in which the corporation is managed, and so in general should not be a matter of concern
to creditors. It may be true that the social interest in limited liability is somewhat attenuated in the case where the shareholder is a
large publicly held corporation. But that is scarcely a strong argument for abrogating the limited liability of corporations owned by
such shareholders, given that affiliates managed by a large publicly
held corporation are not likely to be managed differently from how
they would be managed if they were independent firms. The danger
of abuse of the corporate form is greater in the case of the small
business, where operation of the constituent corporations as separate profit centers is less necessary to assure efficient management.
But an offsetting factor is that individual investors' interest in the
limited liability of corporate affiliates approaches, in the context of
small business, their interest in preserving the limited liability of
3
unaffiliated corporations. 1
I conclude that the case for eliminating the limited liability of
affiliated corporations has not been made. To this it may be replied
that Landers does not want to eliminate their limited liability but
simply to require them, if they want it, to negotiate expressly for it
with their creditors. Although Landers does not discuss the possibility of contracting around a general rule of unlimited liability, I
assume he would permit such contracts. However, if I am correct
that in the case of large companies creditors normally have little
reason to seek to be able to reach the assets of parent or affiliated
corporations, and that in the case of small companies the debtor
would normally insist on expressly limiting the liability of parent
and affiliated corporations, contracting around unlimited liability
would occur frequently and would therefore be a source of substantial, and avoidable, transaction costs. Moreover, as we have seen,
contracting around unlimited liability for tort debts would be inSee pp. 506-07 supra.
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feasible; and, as we shall see, methods other than corporate limited
liability for limiting tort liability are inadequate.3 1 Furthermore,
while outside the tort area the costs of expressly contracting around
unlimited liability would probably be small in the case of the financial creditor (bank, etc.), with whom the debtor would have an
express written contract anyway, those costs might be considerable
where the debtor wished to disclaim liability to a trade or nonbusiness creditor-a materials supplier, employee, etc.-especially since
the courts may refuse to enforce simple disclaimers .32 The consequences of eliminating the limited liability of affiliated corporations
would thus not be trivial.
II.
A.

SPECIFIC POLICY QUESTIONS

Landers's Proposals

1. Landers would like the creditor of a subsidiary corporation
to be able always to pierce the corporate veil and reach the assets
of the parent (or an affiliated) corporation, though in deference to
the policy of limited liability he confines his specific proposal to
piercing the corporate veil to cases where the subsidiary either lacks
"viability" or has failed to observe the procedural formalities required under the applicable state law for setting up a corporation. I
have already suggested that a rule of indiscriminate piercing would
often impose unacceptable risks on the personal owners of a small
corporation that owned or was otherwise affiliated with the corporation whose veil was pierced. Risk, however, is only one factor to be
considered. Another is the creditor's information and supervision
costs. Landers believes those costs would be lower under a rule
allowing the subsidiary's creditors to pierce the corporate veil. I
disagree.
Take the case of unrelated businesses-the parent is engaged
in the production of steel, the subsidiary in the production of cornflakes. The costs of supervision to a creditor of the subsidiary may
be smaller if he knows that he can pierce the corporate veil and
reach the parent's assets; he need not worry that the parent might
strip the subsidiary of the assets necessary to satisfy creditors'
claims. But the creditor's information costs may now be greater.
Evaluating the risk that he will not be repaid will now require an
investigation of the creditworthiness of the parent. The creditor
See text at note 35 infra.
urged by, for example, Slawson, Mass Contracts:Lawful Fraud in California,48
S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1974).
3,

32 As
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unable to pierce the corporate veil would normally forgo such an
33
investigation.
More important, a complete analysis of the effect of piercing
the corporate veil on information and supervision costs must consider the creditors of the subsidiary as well as those of the parent.
If piercing the veil is allowed, the parent's creditors are exposed to
an additional risk-that the parent's assets may be diverted to satisfy the claims of the subsidiary's creditors. To determine the parent's creditworthiness, therefore, prospective creditors of the parent
must also investigate the subsidiary's creditworthiness. Acquiring
the necessary information will become even more complicated if we
allow not only the subsidiary's creditors to reach the assets of the
parent, but the parent's creditors to reach the assets of the subsidiary, an extension implicit in the unitary-enterprise approach proposed by Landers.
The basic point, however, is a simpler one: there is no basis for
believing that a general rule permitting the piercing of the corporate
veil in order to reach the assets of an affiliated corporation would
minimize the costs of credit transactions, and therefore result in
lower interest rates at any given level of risk, even if it did not
impose unacceptable risks on the personal owners of affiliated corporations. Stated otherwise, it has not been established that a general rule allowing the piercing of the corporate veil in the case of
affiliated corporations would approximate the normal desires of the
transacting parties.
2. Landers's proposal to subordinate a parent's loan to a subsidiary to the claims of the subsidiary's independent creditors is also
objectionable, but mainly on different grounds. Like veil piercing,
the prospect of subordination would increase the risk of nonpayment to the parent and thereby induce the parent's creditors to take
account of that prospect in appraising the parent's creditworthiness.
This might in turn lead those creditors to investigate the subsidiary's creditworthiness more carefully than if the parent were merely
another creditor of the subsidiary. But the extent and therefore cost
of the additional credit inquiry would be less than in the veilpiercing case since the potential liability of the parent would be
limited to the amount of the loan.
31 Even in that case, the parent's creditworthiness might affect the appropriate interest
rate on a loan to the subsidiary because the parent might voluntarily mount a rescue operation if the subsidiary became insolvent. Should such rescue operations be limited in order to
protect the parent's creditors? The general answer is probably "no" since failure to rescue
would often impair creditor confidence in the parent, which might increase the risk of default
by the parent. See p. 518 infra.
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In effect, Landers is proposing that the only kind of investment
that a corporation may make in an affiliated corporation is an, equity investment. This is less objectionable than the piercing rule
from the standpoint of burdening creditors of the parent, but it is
independently objectionable as undermining the overall efficiency
of the investment process. Parent corporations are sometimes the
most efficient lenders to their affiliates because the enterprise relationship may enable the parent to evaluate the risk of a default at
a lower cost than an outsider would have to incur. A rule that placed
heavier liabilities on a parent lender than on an outside lender
might thus distort the comparative advantages of these two sources
of credit.
The proposed rule is a dubious one even from the excessively
narrow standpoint of protecting creditors of the affiliate receiving
the loan. The parent may extend credit to its subsidiary on terms
more advantageous to the latter than an independent creditor would
offer because the parent fears that its own creditworthiness would
suffer if the subsidiary became insolvent. The availability of such
loans thus reduces the risk that the subsidiary will in fact default.
If the parent is not allowed to make a "real" loan to a subsidiary-if
in effect the only permitted method of rescue is a contribution of
equity capital-the added risks of this method of rescue may deter
the parent from trying to salvage the subsidiary. If so, the creditors
of the subsidiary will be hurt. There is, to be sure, another side to
the coin. The parent may make the loan merely to conceal the
subsidiary's precarious state and thereby attract new creditors who,
but for the loan, would have been warned away by slow payment or
other symptoms of financial distress that the loan may mask. But
this possibility indicates only that parent-subsidiary lending is susceptible of abuse, and not that creditors in general would be benefited by a rule of automatic subordination of the parent's loan to the
rights of independent creditors.
3. In the case of consolidation in bankruptcy of affiliated corporations, Landers recognizes that the interests of two groups of
creditors are in conflict. To the extent that one of the bankrupts has
greater assets relative to the claims of its own creditors than the
othei has, consolidation harms those creditors and helps the affiliate's creditors. The prospect of consolidation means that a creditor
can make a total evaluation of the risks that he faces only by considering the risk of insolvency of the borrower's affiliates as well as the
risk of insolvency of the borrower itself. Consolidation is thus analytically similar to veil piercing. Landers urges consolidation as the
general rule but would recognize an exception where the creditors
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of one of the corporations have specifically relied on the corporate
separateness of the borrower.
The recognition of this exception is inconsistent with Landers's
treatment of the veil-piercing case. The problem of reliance on the
corporate form arises in the context of attempts to pierce the corporate veil as well as in the consolidation context. Landers assumes it
away in the former context by expressly confining his discussion to
cases where the parent's assets are so great that it cannot be made
insolvent by having to answer for the debts of its subsidiaries. 4 He
reasons that in such cases the parent's creditors cannot be harmed
by a change in law that would reduce the risks borne by the subsidiary's creditors relative to those borne by the parent's creditors. But
this reasoning is unsound. It erroneously treats solvency and insolvency as dichotomous states. As stressed in Part I, the interest rate
on a loan is determined by the estimated risk of default and that
estimate will always fall somewhere in between zero and 100 percent; it will not be zero or 100 percent. Since anything that increases
the estimated risk will lead a creditor to insist on a higher interest
rate, creditors will not be indifferent to changes in law that increase
the risk of a default, even though, ex post, the default does not
materialize. Ex ante they will incur costs to ascertain the change in
the risk of default brought about by an expansion in the rights of
competing creditors. To assume that the parent corporation will still
be solvent after being made liable for the debts of a subsidiary is to
assume away the principal policy issue concerning piercing the
veil-its impact on the costs of credit.
B.

Limited Liability and Creditors' Rights: An Alternative
Approach

Having criticized Landers's approach, I am obliged to suggest
a superior alternative. Unlike Landers, I do not start from the premise that the limited liability of affiliated corporations has an inherent tendency to externalize the costs of new business ventures, disadvantage creditors, or increase the costs of credit transactions.
Limited liability can be abused but the law should focus on the
abuses and preserve the principle.
To this end, it is first necessary to make a distinction between
the involuntary (normally tort) creditor and the voluntary creditor.
In a series of cases in New York, the courts have wrestled with the
11Landers,

supra note 1, at 606-07.
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problem of the taxi company that incorporates each taxicab separately in order to limit its tort liability to accident victims.P In
terms of the analysis in this paper, the separate incorporation of the
taxicabs increases the risk that the taxi company will default on its
tort obligations. If this were a negotiated obligation the creditorvictim would charge a higher interest rate to reflect the increased
risk, but it is not, negotiations between the taxi company and the
accident victims before the accident being infeasible. The result of
separate incorporation is therefore to externalize the costs of taxi
service. But although this result is socially inefficient, the analysis
cannot stop here. Permitting the corporate veil to be pierced would
create an inefficiency of another sort: investment in taxi service
would be discouraged because investors would be unable to limit
their liability, and the information costs of creditors of affiliated
corporations (or for that matter of creditors of noncorporate shareholders) would be increased. To be sure, the enterprise could insure
itself against tort liability. But this would not be a satisfactory
alternative to limited liability. The managers might fail to take out
adequate insurance; the insurance company might for a variety of
reasons refuse or be unable to pay a tort judgment against the insured (the insurance company might for example become insolvent); the particular tort might be excluded from the coverage of the
insurance policy. An alternative would be to preserve limited liability but require every company engaged in dangerous activity to post
a bond equal to the highest reasonable estimate of the probable
extent of its tort liability. Shareholders would be protected; accident costs would be internalized; and the information costs of the
creditors of the affiliated corporations would be minimized.
The other and more important case in which piercing the corporate veil may be warranted is where separate incorporation is misleading to creditors. In this case pooling the assets of the affiliated
corporations for purposes of meeting creditors' claims would reduce
the creditors' information and regulation costs. If corporations are
permitted to represent that they have greater assets to pay creditors
than they actually have, the result will be to increase the costs that
creditors must incur to ascertain the true creditworthiness of the
corporations with which they deal. Misrepresentation is a way of
increasing a creditor's information costs, and the added costs are
5 For a summary of the cases, see H.
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND

252 n.25 (2d ed. 1970). I am assuming that the victim has no

pre-existing contractual relationship with the taxi company-i.e., that he is a pedestrian, or
a driver or occupant of another vehicle, rather than a passenger in the taxi. See note 16 supra.
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wasted from a social standpoint to the extent that the misrepresentation could be prevented at lower cost by an appropriate sanction

against

it.31

Suppose for example that a bank holding company establishes
a subsidiary to invest in real estate. The holding company gives the
subsidiary a name confusingly similar to that of the holding company's banking subsidiary, and the real estate corporation leases
office space in the bank so that its offices appear to be bank offices.
Unsophisticated creditors extend generous terms to the real estate
subsidiary on the reasonable belief that they are dealing with the
bank itself." In these circumstances it would seem appropriate to
"estop" (i.e., forbid) the bank holding company-or even the bank
itself-to deny that it is the entity to which the creditors have
extended credit. To protect the legal separateness of affiliated corporations in this case would lead creditors as a class to invest a
socially excessive amount of resources in determining the true corporate status of the entity to which they were asked to extend
credit.3
In general, a corporation's creditors should be allowed to reach
a shareholder's assets when the shareholder, whether an individual
or another corporation, has represented to the creditor that those
assets are in fact available to satisfy any claim that the creditor may
assert against the debtor corporation. Misrepresentation is a familiar and widely used concept in the law, with strong intuitive appeal,
and its use in the present context is firmly grounded in the economics of credit and information. Moreover, it is the dominant approach
in fact used by the courts in deciding whether to pierce the corporate
veil. True, they often describe the criterion for piercing as whether
the debtor corporation is merely an "agent," "alter ego," or "instrumentality" of the shareholder, which as Landers points out is a
confusing test.3 9 A careful reading of these decisions suggests, however, that in applying the "agent-alter ego-instrumentality" test the
courts commonly ask whether the parent engaged in conduct or
3, On the simple economics of fraud, see R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE
FTC 3-9 (1973); for a more technical treatment, see Darby & Karni, Free Competition and
the OptimalAmount of Fraud, 16 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1973); and on the underlying economics
of information, see G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1968).
11 By an "unsophisticated" creditor, I mean one to whom the costs of ascertaining the
true corporate status of the real estate company would be substantial. A "reasonable belief"
means simply a belief based upon an optimal investigation of that corporate status.
"' See F. Black, M. Miller, & R. Posner, supra note t, at 28-31 (for a detailed discussion
of this example).
", See Landers, supra note 1, at 626.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:499

made representations likely to deceive the creditor into thinking
that the debtor had more assets than it really had or that the parent
was the real debtor.' And some courts have explicitly adopted a
misrepresentation rationale for determining whether to pierce the
4
corporate veil. '
Because a misrepresentation test requires weighing the individual facts and circumstances in each case and somehow discovering
what the creditor thought and whether he was reasonable in so
thinking, it is more difficult to apply than a rule simply abolishing
the limited liability of shareholders that are corporations. But it is
no more difficult to apply than Landers's interim test of "viability"
(whatever that means) plus procedural observances, 4 and it could
be made more precise in a number of ways.
One way would be to make clear that the test is an "objective"
one; the issue should be not what the creditor in fact thought but
what a reasonable person in the creditor's situation would have
thought. Another way would be to differentiate among types of creditors in terms of their information costs. A financial creditor, such
as a consortium of banks, can discover the true financial situation
JO See, e.g., Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 345-47 (2d Cir. 1942); Stone
v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1942); Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co., 121
F.2d 112, 113'(8th Cir. 1941); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 1941); Stark Elec.
R.R. v. M'Ginty Contracting Co., 238 F. 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1917); Bartle v. Home Owners
Co-Operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955); North v. Higbee Co., 131
Ohio St. 507, 514-18, 527, 3 N.E.2d 391, 394-95, 399 (1936); cf. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg.
& Car. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 198, 50 N.W. 1117, 1121 (1892). A particularly good example of
the approach is Gledkill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 388-89, 262 N.W. 371, 372-73 (1935),
where the court states:
In the case at bar I am unable to find that any control exercised over the WestbrookLane Properties Corp. by Fisher & Co. [the parent] was exercised in such a manner as
to defraud or wrong the plaintiffs, or that such domination was in any way injurious to
them. In entering into the land contract, plaintiffs relied entirely upon the WestbrookLane Corporation as the sole and actual purchaser. There was no representation by
Fisher & Co. that it was the real party in interest or that its responsibility was in back
of the Westbrook-Lane Corporation. In fact, plaintiffs did not know at that time that
their vendee was a subsidiary of the New Center Corporation or of Fisher & Co.
1 See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Co., 483 F.2d 1098,
1102 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 238, 240 n.18 (2d Cir.
1960). See also H. HENN, supranote 35, at 259; Note, Liability of a Corporationfor Acts of a
Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 1122, 1123, 1125 (1958).
12See Landers, supra note 1, at 621-22, 625-26. Landers's test is actually more complicated than this since he would allow as a defense to the creditor's attempt to pierce the veil
a showing that the creditor knew or should have known what the assets of the corporation
to which he extended credit really were. Id. at 625-26. Here and elsewhere Landers's article
suggests that his interim test for veil piercing, at least, is based on a misrepresentation
rational. See, e.g., id. at 623. But this interpretation is weakened by his emphatic rejection
of fraud as a basis for veil piercing. Id. at 626.

19761

Affiliated Corporations

of the debtor at lower cost than the trade creditor, and the latter in
turn at lower cost than the nonbusiness creditor. (The financial
creditor generally extends the greatest amount of credit to each
debtor and therefore has the greatest incentive to investigate the
debtor's creditworthiness; he also has the greatest degree of specialization in appraising credit risk). Perhaps the courts should raise a
presumption against piercing the veil in the case of the financial
creditor and a presumption in favor of piercing in the case of the
non-business creditor.
The courts might also develop rules for treating creditors on an
aggregated basis, the usual approach in bankruptcy proceedings,
rather than adjudicating the question of each creditor's relative
knowledge. An entire class of creditors might be granted a right to
recover on the basis of evidence that a significant fraction of their
number was or was likely to have been misled. For example, were
there evidence that some trade creditors had actually or probably
been misled, trade creditors as a class might be permitted to invoke
the misrepresentation rationale as a basis for recovery against the
affiliate that had engaged in the misrepresentation. My conclusion
is that a misrepresentation approach, which seems clearly sounder
than Landers's "single enterprise" approach as a matter of principle, is susceptible of practical application.
The misrepresentation approach can also be used to answer the
other two specific questions discussed by Landers-subordination of
the parent's loans and consolidation of bankrupt affiliates. Although a rule of automatic subordination would be inappropriate,
a creditor should be permitted to show that the parent's loan misled
him regarding the amount of assets the corporation had available
for repayment of his loan. He may have reasonably believed that the
corporation had the usual equity capitalization for a corporation of
its size and line of business.43 If these reasonable expectations were
defeated because the parent supplied capital to the corporation in
the form of a loan rather than equity, the parent should be estopped
to deny that the loan is actually a part of the subsidiary's equity
capital. Similarly, consolidation of bankrupt affiliates should be
permitted where the creditor of one of the affiliates reasonably relied
,3 "Usual" capitalization could be determined by an examination of the capital structures of a representative sample of the debtor's competitors, excluding any firm that was an

affiliate of another firm. The examination might, however, disclose a variance in the amount
of capital among these firms large enough to negative the creditor's claim that he had relied
on the debtor's having the amount of capital that was "normal" for firms in its line of
business; that is, there might be no norm.
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on an appearance of greater capitalization than in fact existed.
In all cases in which estoppel is successfully invoked some competing group of creditors will be disadvantaged whose expectations
may have been just as reasonable as those of the creditors invoking
estoppel. But to the extent that enforcing the estoppel or misrepresentation principle will discourage borrowers from using the corporate form to mislead creditors, creditors in general will benefit-as
will society since the costs of credit transactions will be lower, and
hence interest rates will be lower for any given level of risk.
The suggested approach deals automatically with the problem
especially troubling to Landers of the entrepreneur who, in order to
avoid creditor and other claims, divides a truly unitary business into
a number of separate corporations. Insofar as creditors are misled
by the proliferation of affiliated corporations, the misrepresentation
principle affords them a remedy. If they are not misled, the proliferation of corporations is harmless and should be ignored.
C.

A Summary Comparison of the Suggested Approaches

The basic difference between Landers and me over the question
of the limited liability of affiliated corporations is that he thinks
that the abuses of limited liability are so prevalent in this context
as to warrant a rule dispensing with the need to prove that an abuse
occurred. I reject this approach because the principle of limited
liability has considerable merits even in the affiliation context,
when all relevant costs and benefits are considered. Moreover, I
conjecture that Landers has exaggerated the prevalence of abuses
by limiting his data source to reported bankruptcy cases. Cases in
which the debtor actually becomes bankrupt are not likely to constitute a representative sample of credit transactions generally." This
is especially so because under current law proof of misrepresentation
is usually necessary for the corporate veil to be pierced. This means
that someone who just reads cases on veil piercing will come away
with an impression that the usual purpose and effect of corporate
affiliation is to mislead creditors. But any rule allowing the piercing
of the corporate veil will affect business behavior across the entire
range of credit transactions rather than just the limited and unrepresentative sample of behavior of the defendants in reported veilpiercing cases.
It is also possible to exaggerate the virtues of simple legal rules,
" Cf. D.

STANLEY

& M.

GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM

107-17 (1971).
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such as a rule abolishing the limited liability of shareholders that
are corporations. There are two points to be made here. The first is
that the simple, flat rule opens up loopholes. Landers limits his
analysis to the 100 percent affiliate. He does not discuss the case
where some of the shares of the affiliate are owned by others. That
case is apparently to be taken care of by some other rule; or perhaps
limited liability is to remain sacrosanct whenever there is less than
100 percent ownership by the parent or affiliate. But to draw so
sharp a legal distinction between the case where the parent owns 100
percent of the common stock of its subsidiary and the case where it
owns 99.9 percent is not only arbitrary; it invites the creation of tiny
minority stock interests for the precise purpose of escaping Landers's rules. In a complete analysis, Landers would be forced to
propose additional rules to close up this loophole.45 A misrepresentation approach does not have this defect because it is unaffected
by the presence of minority shareholders save insofar as their presence might, in a rare case, affect creditors' reasonable expectations.
The second point is that a rule abolishing the limited liability
of separate corporations, while simpler than one that makes veil
piercing contingent on proof of misrepresentation, is not necessarily
cheaper to administer than the latter rule. The question whether
simple rules really reduce the net costs of legal administration has
been extensively discussed in the context of whether to supplant
negligence by strict liability in tort cases. Proponents of strict liability point out, correctly, that it simplifies the trial of the individual
case by eliminating one of the issues in the trial-the issue of
fault-and that by simplifying the trial, and thereby facilitating
prediction of its outcome, it also reduces the fraction of disputes
likely to be litigated. However, the proponents typically ignore the
fact that strict liability would expand the universe of potential
claims by increasing the scope of liability for injury-creating conduct. Each case might be cheaper to try, and the fraction of claims
actually tried might be smaller, but the absolute number of claims
tried would be larger, and the total administrative costs-which are
the product of the cost per case litigated, the fraction of claims
litigated, and the total number of claims-might actually rise."
It is the same with piercing the corporate veil. If the veil may
A similar problem is created by his proposal for subordinating parents' loans. Parents
would have an incentive to contribute capital in forms (e.g., equipment leases) that might
escape being classified as "loans" for purposes of the rule.
49See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 205, 209 (1973).
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always be pierced to reach an affiliated corporation's assets, then
the litigation of each veil-piercing case will be simpler, and the
fraction of creditors' claims against affiliated corporations that are
litigated will therefore be smaller; but the number of potential
claims by creditors against parent or other affiliated corporations
will be much greater than under a rule that entitles the creditor to
pierce the corporate veil only if he has been misled. Thus, if the
incidence of abuse of the corporate form in the affiliation setting is
in fact small-if most creditors of affiliated corporations are not
misled into thinking that they are dealing with the debtor's parent
or affiliated corporation-the expansion of liability implicit in Landers's suggested approach could result in greatly increased administrative costs by allowing a large number of claims to be pressed that
would be frivolous under existing law.
The most serious objection to Landers's suggested approach,
however, is that it would impair a socially valuable principle, that
of limited corporate liability, which I have argued retains much of
its importance in the context of affiliated corporations. The risks of
small business might be materially enhanced if small venturers
could not limit their risk in undertaking a new venture to their
investment in that venture. Although Landers appears to be willing
to allow affiliated corporations expressly to negotiate for limited
liability, this would not take care of the investor's exposure to tort
liability; and disclaiming liability to the many small trade and nonbusiness creditors with which a corporation deals could be quite
costly-even prohibitively so if the courts refused to honor simple
disclaimers of unlimited liability.

